Report of the Expert Committee on Small EnterprisesChairman
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Annex p.1 F.No. 13(24)/95-SSI(P) Government of India Ministry of Industry Department of Small Scale industries and Agro and Rural Industries New Delhi , 29th December, 1995 An elaborate set of policies, programmes an institution has evolved over the past four decades for providing government support for the promotion of small industries in India. The Government have in the meantime implemented a programme of economic reforms including industrial and trade policy reforms whose objectives have been to eliminate bureaucratic control and protectionist measures, allow greater play to the market forces in shaping entrepreneurial decision making and promote competition. Globalisation and change in technology are also emerging as the major forces that will modify and mould the environment for small business an entrepreneurship over the next decade and beyond, Small enterprises in many barriers of the service sector, are fast emerging as provider of employment and contributors to exportdevelopment which necessiates reconsideration of the view that the policies for small enterprise development should concentrate on the manufacturing sector. It is thus, necessary to address the need for reforms in the existing policies and design new policies for small and medium enterprises (SME) development which will facilitate the growth of viable an efficient enterprises that can adjust to technological change and remain internationally competitive. It has, therefore, been decided to constitute an "Expert Committee on Small Enterprises" which will go into these issues in depth and make is recommendations to the Government. The Committee will consist of the following: 1. Shri Abid Hussain Chairman
2. Dr. R.A.Mashelkar Member
3. Shri H.C. Gandhi Member
4. Shri J.V. Shetty, Chairman and Member
5. Dr. J.C. Sandesara, Hony, Professor Member
6. Dr. V.G. Patil, Director Member
7. Dr. Sailendra Narain Member
8. Shri S. A. T. Rizvi Member
9. Dr. Rakesh Mohan Member-Secretary
The Committee will adopt its own procedure of work and may take evidence from any interested party, as deemed proper. It should submit its report to the Government within three months.
BRAHM DUTT, Jt Secy.
The small scale sector occupies an important place in the country’s economy. The existence of small scale units is essential to encourage to encourage the spread of industrial entrepreneurship throughout the country. It is therefore necessary for the small scale sector to be provided a proper environment for growth an efficiency. The objective of policy for Small Scale Enterprises (SSEs) must be to nurture such an environment. For setting this objective, it much be recognized that there is an organic growth potential gets developed in the right policy environment, this potential gets developed. Further the imperatives of market and technology enable a healthy small scale operation to grow into a medium scale unit just as a medium scale unit becomes large, and a large national company aspires to emerge a an international business. There will always be industrial activities which are best done in the tiny, small or medium units rather than in large units. An efficient industrial system is so organised that the interlinkages between the small, medium and large sectors are mutually reinforcing and not competitively erosive. The existing framework of policy support for the small scale sector evolved essentially in the environment of the 1950s an 1960s and then continued until the present time. The economic and social framework was quite different at the these policies were designed. Almost all industrial activity was controlled by the industrial licensing system; trade was controlled through the export import control system; foreign investment and technology were heavily controlled as well. In this framework, since industrial activity depended on the attainment of different government approvals, mostly at the central level, it was particularly difficult for small industries to enter into the industrial sector. At the time same, during the 1950s, and 1960s, during the first two decades after independence there was a great need to encourage entrepreneurship which had been kept dormant during the colonial era, Government activity was also marked by missionary zeal and different kinds of extension activities in both he rural and urban areas were started successfully by government agencies. In such a framework it was logical to provide support for small scale industries on a protective basis by providing subsidies, concessions, small scale industry reservations and direct government support to SSI units. The basic structure of industrialisation has evolved over time and therefore the policy framework for small scale industry policy needs to change alongwith the new economic and social framework which now exists in the country. We now have to recognise that government over time has become more bureaucratic and rule bound and can no longer be characterized as mission oriented. Many of the earlier systems for supporting small scale industries have instead emerged as bureaucratic bottlenecks which tend to restrict their growth rather than helping in their entry or in their expansion. The new framework for supporting small scale industries must therefore be much less dependent on the government and be more market oriented. Such a framework should derive support from non official sources and derive its strength from market imperatives. The basic accent of India’s policy for small scale industries has been defensive, aiming to insulate the small-scale sector from the dynamics of competitive growth. In the world of today, such insulation is not practicable. To begin with, the definition of a small-scale unit is in financial and not economic terms. Not only is that definition misplaced but in these times of inflationary pressures it soon becomes meaningless as assets become more and more expensive. In fact, a common practice, as a consequence, consists of dividing up assets between different small units. Indeed, quite often these latter exist only on paper undermining the futile basis of such policy. Again, instead of focusing on areas that should be the province of the small scale sector by economic rationale, the SSI policy has traditionally concentrated on exclusive reservation of activities for this sector. In this process, it has lost sight of the simple but determining logic of a market system that it can not make business sense for a large company to do anything that can be done more competitively by a small unit. A policy of exclusive reservation for small-scale industry therefore is at best unnecessary and at worst inefficient. Much of the existing policy framework was designed to assist individual units. These units were seen as free standing units with little relationship to others. Thus direct services were provided to individual units through government agencies, through fiscal incentives, and through financial subsidies. With the success of many of these measures the small scale sector has expanded greatly and it is no longer possible for the government to provide direct individual assistance in the way that has been done in the past. With the changes that have taken place in economic policies since 1991 many of the older restrictions no longer exist. Few clearances are required from the central government level. Consequently some of the biases against small scale industries have been removed. A great deal of entrepreneurship has emerged in the country. They now need to be nurtured for growth. The new policy framework must recognise this new economic environment and should now be designed to be much more promotional rather than protective. India being such a large country the existing centralised approach can no longer be effective. The states will now have to handle most of the programmes of polilcy support for small scale industries. In addition, states also have to recognise the existence of concentrations of small scale units in readily identifiable areas and design their support programmes accordingly. Small scale enterprises will continue to need exceptional support in terms of financial resources, technological development and infrastructure. It is much easier to organise such support systems in clusters where industries of similar characteristics exist together to reap the benefits of agglomeration economics. State governments will have to explore innovative ways of creating public private partnership with industry associations, business associations, and others to provide the kind of support that small scale industries need. The Expert Group’s recommendations have been based on this general view of the small scale sector. This report presents a comprehensive analysis of the economics of small-scale industries in general terms, followed by a detailed look at the Indian case. In Chapter 1 the basic theoretical case for policy interventions to promote the development of SSE’s is presented having regard to the working of factor markets in developing countries. The general directions of interventions suggested by this analysis are outlined in Chapter 2 and the need to move away from the traditional Indian policy of reservation is stressed. We have then examined the Indian experience in terms of policies and outcomes. Following a discussion in Chapter 3 of major policy measures adopted to help SSEs in India, Chapte 4 draws on a variety of available statistical sources to present a comprehensive view of the SSE sector in India, and how it has evolved in the last three decades. We discuss the size and growth of the SSI sector, its regional distribution, as well as the evidence on its relative efficiency. The next chapter traces the implications of the new economic environment for SSIs and provides pointers to the kind of policy changes that should be made in Chapter 6 we provide an analysis of the shortcomings of the existings policies and recommend the new directions that policy for small scale enterprises should take.
I. THE CASE FOR POLICY INTERVENTION TO PROMOTE SMALL SCALE ENTERPRISES The arguments advanced in the literature for promotion of small-scale enterprises (SSE) involve both certain desirable characteristics of such enterprises (e.g. their labour intensity and related positive distribution effects, their flexibility, their potential contribution to decentralization, their promotion of entrepreneurship etc,) and a common belief that that under normal market conditions either too few, or the worng combination of resources will be employed in such enterprises it is important to distinguish between the reasons why one hopes to see a flourishing small scale industry (SSI) sector (having to do with its positive features) and the need for sector specific support programs. Such programs are necessary if an when market imperfections may impede the sector’s full flowering in the sense that the size of the sector is below the ‘optimum’ which might be reached in the absence of such imperfections. It markets and more general policies worked adequately, SSI might live up to its potential without any special support programs. The basic imperfection which might lead to a less than optimal size of SSI lies in the area of factor markets – of both labour and capital. It is argued below that in most economics – and in developing countries in particular – capital market imperfections are more basic to the non-optimal size of the SSI than labour market imperfections. The factor market distortion argument developed in section 12 might suggest that the correct inference to be drawn from the discussion is that the problem of less than optimal size of SSI is best tackled by confronting it at its source – enacting policies to remove capital market distortions. This is indeed that first best solution, but it will emerge from the discussion in this section that the reasons for capital market segmentation are such that they are hard to remove through direct interventions. Hence the need to adopt supportive policies for SSI development as a second best solution. The argument is extended to considerations of distribution of income, and we conclude that equity objectives provide additional support to the argument based on efficiency objectives for selective policies of assistance to SSI. We then explore some additional reasons for promoting SSI growth over and above the basic reasons based on factor market imperfections. While the basic argument for supporting SSI is established in the following three sections, we then turn to a cautionary note about indiscriminate support of SSI. Efficiency and growth objectives economies of scale or attaining technical efficiency. The discussion in this section points to the adoption of policies of support which enable SSIs to exploit available opportunities for efficient economic performance and growth. 1.2 The Factor Price Distortion Argument It is commonly argued that, for various institutional reasons, labor used in large enterprises (LEs) is priced well above the levels at which it is used in small enterprises (SEs). At the same time capital is generally much cheaper for the larger firms it might appear that the price differences for the two factors between LEs pull in opposite directions and would compensate each other, so that the relative profitability of the two types would not be greatly affected. However, we shall now develop the argument that price differences affecting the use of capital are much more important in affecting the relative costs of factors than the differences in wages per worker. If this is the case, there are two ways in which the economic outcome left to itself would be produce a sub optimal situation from the efficiency point-of-view first, the SSI sector which uses more labour and less capital per unit of output will have relatively higher costs and hence have an over-all size in the economy which is less than optimal. Secondly, if the price of labour facing large firms is too high compared to the true economic (opportunity) cost of labour, and the price of capital too low, then large firms would be using a higher ratio of capital to labour than would be socially optimal. 1.21 Why Capital Market Segmentation is More Important The basic reason why differences in the price of capital are more important for the cost structures of large and small enterprises than the differences in wage per worker is that a higher wage facing the large firm could be, and is generally compensated for by higher efficiency of the workforce – so that the wage cost per efficiency unit of labour is much less than the observed difference in the price of capital. Labour is a factor of production, which can be applied at varying quality levels. Large firms with higher wage could, at least upto a point, attain higher efficiency of their workforces through better selection and also internal skill formation. Capital or finance, however is a factor of production without this extra dimension to its supply. A rupee is a rupee and there is nothing to compensate for the higher cost of a rupee available to smaller firms. In fact, in some scenarios it might be more appropriate to hypothesize that it is not the institutionally determined higher wage, which causes the capital-labour ratio, and hence labour productively to be higher in large firms, but rather the line of causation runs the other way round. Capital market segmentation makes the price of capital relatively low for large firms, and this encourages a higher capital intensity and labour productivity – which is its turn enables the large firm to pay higher wages per man and select a body of workers more appropriate to its organizational style nd skill requirements. 1.22 Non-Institutional Factors Causing Labour Market Segmentation While both labour legistation and trade union action have been an important part of the urban labour market scene, more so perhaps in South Asia compared to other parts of the continent, it would be extreme and unhistorical to suggest that the origin of labour market segmentation could be found primarily in these types of institutional factors. Detailed studies of labour markets and their evolution in developing countries have suggested that a number of factors, other than labour legislation operate singly or in combination to cause wage levels in the large scale sector to be set at higher levels than in the small scale sector. These can be listed as follows:
1.23 Capital Market Segmentation Capital market segmentation is a natural outgrowth of some basic characteristics of the economy. First, the administrative, selection and insurance costs of loans from the banking system have pronounced economies of scale with respect to the loan size. The information cost for assessing an SSE project is often a substantial lump sum amount which works out much cheaper per unit of credit as the size of the loan increases. In addition, the ready availability of relevant data might be a problem for SSEs. Secondly, the size of acceptable collateral which reduces lenders’ risk obviously increases with firm size. For small firms, particularly newly established ones, the only security available for a potential lender is its personal credit evaluation of the entrepreneur himself. Formal lending institutions are unlikely to have easy and reliable access to detailed information about a small entrepreneur. Thirdly, the unequal distribution of wealth and savings implies that the supply of potential capital from ‘friends and family’, which figure prominently in the financing of small enterprises is necessarily limited. Because some of these factors causing capital market segmentation are endemic to the working of modern societies – both developed and developing – most economies have adopted various measures to intervene in the financial sector to make capital more easily available to SSEs. However, as the problem has very deep roots, such measures have by themselves been inadequate. Governments have generally been induced to supplement policies of financial market intervention with more direct measures to promote the SSEs. Some of these are reviewed in the next chapter. To say that capital market problems take precedence over those of the labour market is not to deny that the latter are without importance. Unions and labour legislation have in recent years increased the level of wages facing LEs beyond the levels established by economic forces )Little, mazumdar and page, Chapter 7; lieberman 1990). At the same time job security legislation has sought to protect workers in LEs from lay layoffs and plant closures (ILO-STAT 1996). It might appear at first sight that these institutional pressures in the labour market redresses the balance against SSEs arising from capital market segmentation, but if they do so, they do it in a distortionary way by inducing LEs to be even more capital intensive – further away from the socially optimal capital – lbour ratio. Furthermore, an important way in which such developments in the labour market damage the healthy growth of SSEs is by acting as impediments in their vertical mobility. SSEs might be wary of growing beyond a threshold size which would bring them under the purview of labour legislation or subject them to union pressure. They might lack the financial resources to graduate to the higher capital intensity needed. Also, while established LEs might over time be able to develop a system of labour utilization which increases labor efficiency to compensate at least partly for the higher wages, SSEs might not be able to bear the costs of transition while the more efficient labour system is being developed within the firm but they are still required to pay the higher wages. Job security legislation, while it encourages subcontracting to SSEs, adds to labour costs and reduces the turnover of efficient LEs. This reduces the opportunity for graduation of efficient SSEs as much as it discourages expansion of more competitive LEs. 1.3 The Distribution of Income Argument Considerations of equity would strengthen the general direction of the conclusion reached above. There are three ways in which an economy with a larger presence of SSEs would have a more equal distribution of income:
The last point s particularly relevant in the light of the discussion above about the nature of wage differentials between SSEs and LEs. It was argued that the difference in the efficiency wage would generally be much smaller than the difference in wages per worker. Take a hypothetical example where the difference in wages per worker is completely offset by differences in worker efficiency – whether through the employers adopting a selection process of workers acting on their own or reacting to institutionally imposed wage differentials. In this case there is no difference in wage cost per efficiency unit, and there is no problem of allocative inefficiency as far as the labour market is concerned. But left to itself the economy will be split between an LE sector with a relatively small workforce of high efficiency and high wages, and a large SE sector in which a large portion of the manufacturing workforce will be employed at low levels of efficiency and wages. This scenario presents a highly unequal distribution of labour earnings. Equity considerations require that SSEs should be promoted. But a point of some importance should be noted here. The distribution of labour earnings will not be improved if the SE sector merely expands horizontally at the unchanged level of earnings. It is important that there is increase in labour productivity and / or upward mobility of the SSEs so that a larger percentage of the labour force cound graduate to the middle rungs of the earnings distribution. Thus promoting development of SSEs for its won sake without regard to its potential productivity is self-defeating. Growth of inefficient SSEs is undesirable from the point of view of both equity goals within the manufacturing sector (and the urban labour market), and of increasing output and its growth rate. We shall come back to this point late in the Chapter. But for the moment let us look at some other arguments which have been advanced for the encouragement of the SE sector. 1.4 Other Reasons for Promoting SSEs 1.41 Product Differentiation There has been some emphasis on the idea of product heterogeneity and product differentiation within the same broad ‘product group’ as an additional reason for the coexistence of small and large firms. Even when firms of different sizes produce ostensibly the same product (for example, a bar of washing soap), the qualities which are contained in different brands of soap will differ markedly. Small firms generally cater to the low income groups and will, therefore, tend to concentrate on brands which emphasize basic product attributes such as cleaning power over more cosmetic properties such as fragrance. Simple technologies could be more appropriate in the production of he basic attributes meeting with demand from low income consumers. Small or micro enterprises may be able to use such technologies successfully with low capital-labour ratios, while larger capital intensive firms which cater to the high income segment of the market may use more mechanised technologies to produce the attributes demanded by the wealthier consumers. On the other hand, small enterprises sometimes produce luxury products, making intensive use of skilled labour, which essentially cater to the luxury segment of the market and which the large firms cannot supply. Elements in the market structure, such as monopoly pricing, advertising and barriers to entry, accentuate product market segmentation which increases the economic distance between large and small firms. It is possible that in many lines of production, this type of product market segmentation helps to perpetuate industrial dualism. It has sometimes been argued that the welfare of low income groups is best served by promoting the ‘low quality’ products, without the additional attributes. This, it has been argued, would not only meet the basic needs of poor consumers, but the less mechanised techniques used in the manufacture of these products would produce more income for the very same consumers because of the higher labour intensity of such techniques. However, if the products made with less mechanised techniques are priced cheaper, then they would obviously be bought by poor consumers. Therefore, the argument for further intervention can then only be that such groups should be induced to buy more of such products, or not so poor groups should also buy these products. But before they embark on such a course of intervention policy markers should be aware of the full implications of this argument. First, it is tantamount to paternalistic overriding of the principal of consumer sovereignty. It is in effect being argued that the low income consumers, if they are buying products with additional attributes which the more mechanised processes can supply at higher prices, they do not know what they are doing, and policy makers know better about what the poor people’s preference ought to be. Secondly the protection of non-mechanised technique, beyond the point which market prices support, perpetuates outmoded technology and lead to general technological stagnation in the economy. Clearly these types of protection do not prepare the economy for international competitiveness. Lack of technological progress leads to slower growth of productivity and wages in the long-run hence hurt the welfare of low income earners whose interests are supposedly being promoted. It is possible to admit one specific exception to the above argument. The luxury attributes being produced by more mechanised techniques might be priced more competitively because the cost of capital and finance is lower for the larger mechanised establishments as discussed at length above. The financial market intervention is supposed to correct for this capital market segmentation. Additionally, excise taxes on luxury goods have been always been accepted as a legitimate fiscal tool of redistribution provided it is not overdone. 1.42 Flexibility An advantage adduced more frequently in the last few years is that small firms are better able to adept to changing, and sometimes disruptive, economic circumstances. The 1970s and 1980s have produced several shocks demanding a flexible response from industrial firms. According to some authors, traditional mass production units have been less successful in this regard than have small establishments based on a modern version of the craft principle that ‘flexible tasks and machines augment the craftsmen’s skill’s and ability to produce ever more varied products’ (Schmitz 1982:4). The most influential work embodying these ideas is that by Piore and Sabel (1984). Their paradigm of successful ‘flexible adjustment’ comes from the recent appearance in italy, Germany and Japan of a ‘new’ type of industrial unit: flexible, small, and better able to respond to the challenges of the last two decades than the giant plants of the older industrial countries like the United States. In particular, the development of a vast network of very small enterprise is impressive, spread through the villages and small cities of central and northern Italy. These little shops range across the entire spectrum of modern industry, from shoes, ceramics, textiles and garments to motorcycles, agricultural equipment, automotive parts an machine tasks. The firms perform an enormous variety of the operations associated with mass production, excluding only the kind of final assembly involved in the automobile production line’ (Piore an Sabel 1984). Average size varies by industry, but is generally extremely small, with shops of ten workers or fewer not uncommon. The flexibility which has been viewed as a hallmark of Taiwanese small firms certainly seems to fit this pattern (Levy 1991). Although there is considerable anecdotal evidence from other countries, organized information remains limited. It should be noted that the flexible and quick response to changing economic conditions which is often the special advantage of SSIs is much more feasible in an economy which is undergoing liberalization. The importance of this point could then be expected to increase in the Indian conditions, and will be strengthened with better access of business to information technology. 1.43 Contribution Export Potential Chen (1986) concludes that the experiences of Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan suggest that a strong and viable small industrial sector is necessary for successful export oriented growth. In the early stages of manufactured export growth, small-scale industry can play a significant role since products are labour intensive, there are rapid changes in demand, due in part to world economic fluctuations, and output growth is demand driven. Small firms have the advantage of law overheads and the capacity to respond quickly to changing conditions. There is a growing international preference for high quality personalized items, often skill-intensive, in place of mass-produced ones. Such products require flexibility, which often gives the smaller firm the advantage. According to Beng (1988), a reliable supporting sector has been important in attracting high technology foreign investment to Singapore. Otherwise the foreign firms either would have to bring in their own subcontractors or import foreign workers, neither of which was in line with the long term objectives o government policy. In Japan, and more recently in Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and elsewhere, subcontracting with small producers has allowed the export sector to keep costs down an flexibility high. Small firms’ absorptive capacity can also be an important determinant of technology transfer, in Singapore, for instance, a major channel involves skilled personnel, previously trained by a multinational company, who then take up employment in smaller local firms or start their own (Beng 1988). The Indian experience of SSIs has not been disappointing as far as the export potential is concerned. But as with the recent Asian developing countries just mentioned the continuing success of this sector will depend on their ability to move into technologically more advanced and sophisticated product lines. The ‘flying geese’ paradigm of industrial growth is as applicable to SSIs as to large-scale industries. Traditional industries with low levels of technology reach their peak and unless enterprises graduate to new generations of products the dynamism of growth slows down. 1.44 Other Economic and Social Advantages Small-scale industry is also expected to perform better than larger firms in two other areas: contribution to decentralization and the fostering of entrepreneurship. Support for SSI has often been based in part on the hope of reducing the excessive infrastructure and social costs associated with large assembly plants and large urban agglomerations. Ho (1979, 1980) contrasted the regional dispersion of industry in Taiwan (with its prominent SSI sector) with Korea (with its dominant large firms). In general, it appears that very small (mainly household) enterprise is much more widely dispersed, including a fairly high density in rural areas, than are small-medium plants (World Bank 1978). Another major objective has been the promotion of a widely based class of small entrepreneurs. We refer in a succeeding chapter to the case of Taiwan where, at the outset of the period of export-led industrialization, Japanese trading companies led the way by promoting subcontracting and exporting through a network of small and medium manufacturers and export traders. 1.5 The Need for Selectivity in SSE Promotion The arguments considered so far have implicitly assumed that all firms – large or small – are equally efficient in the utilization of the factors of production, though they might be using different combinations of capital and labour due to factor market distortions. But there are two classes of situations in which this assumption might not be valid. 1.51 Economies of Scale Clearly the case based on allocative efficiency will be dampened if there are sufficiently strong economies of scale in production. The claims of large scale industries since the Industrial Revolution in Europe have been based on the importance of increasing returns to scale in mechanised production, and have been strengthened by the development of "Fordist" industries of mass production. More recently, as mentioned above, recent developments in technology and the market for consumer goods have to some extent devalued the older sources of increasing returns. Industrial economists are talking about a "third industrial revolution" which has ushered in an era of technology and market specialisation which favour a much smaller optimum size of the firm even in the developed economies. It is important to make the point here that in some line of industry economies of scale would be important and to impose administrative controls on the expansion of large units in such industries with a view to promoting the small scale sector would be welfare reducing. This is obviously a matter for empirical investigation. In any case this underlines the danger of blanket policy measures which seek to promote small-scale units without reference to the production technologies in individual industries. Equally, the argument strongly supports the need for the formulation of support policies for SSEs which does not discourage growth. Policies which merely seek to protect SSEs err on the side of encouraging stagnation and ultimately high costs for both producers and consumers. 1.52 Technical Efficiency While allocative inefficiency arises when a firm is operating at a point on its production function which is inappropriate at the optimal factor price ratio prevailing in the economy, technical inefficiency arises if the firm is operating below the production frontier i.e. if it is not attaining the maximum level of production which it is in fact enjoying. Only a few firms in any group of firms we consider would in fact attain or be close to attaining maximum technical efficiency. The average productively per unit of factor input of the firms in the group being considered would be below the level of the maximum achieved by the firms at the frontier. The ratio of the average to the ‘frontier’ productivity is an index of technical efficiency for the group. When we say that small firms as a group have higher technical inefficiency than large firms, we hypothesize that the index of average to ‘frontier’ productivity for the small, after allowing for the appropriate ratio of capital to labour, will be lower than that for the large. Clearly this is a matter for empirical investigation which can be undertaken with firm level analysis of micro data. But even if such analysis reveals higher levels higher levels of technical inefficiency for small firms, it does not signal policy conclusions biased against the small scale unless we examine the causes of the higher incidence of technical inefficiency. For example, such inefficiency might be caused by general conditions of the economy which make it difficult for small firms to obtain necessary inputs or marketing services. Thus small firms are often hampered by the absence of reliable, continuous sources of raw materials or electricity. This was particularly important in the earlier license / quota regime in India. More generally, small firms as a group might suffer from technical inefficiency relative to larger enterprises if one more of the following factors are present in an important way:
This chapter has argued that there is a strong case for adopting support policies which would encourage the development of SSIs beyond the point which the sector might attain left to free market forces. From the point of view of allocative efficiency, equitable distribution of incomes and several desirable objectives of healthy social and economic growth, we have seen that the size of the sector would be less than optimal in the absence of such policies. The argument developed above on factor markets suggests that the apparent ‘distortion’ in labour markets could be exaggerated if one just looks at the difference in earnings per worker in small and large firms. This is because large firms could and generally do develop a workforce of higher efficiency to suit their specific organisational needs, so that the wage cost per efficiency unit of labour is not nearly as great. On the other hand, capital does not have an extra dimension in quality, and hence the significantly higher price of capital available to small firms constitutes a genuine disincentive. The appropriate solution to correcting this important disadvantage to the small scale sector is to intervene directly in the market for finance to remove the impact of capital market segmentation. But, as will be pointed out at greater length in the next chapter, most governments have found that only a limited amount can be achieved through policies impacting directly on the financial structure. This is because capital market segmentation is endemic to the working of most economies, and is particularly serious in developing countries with their relatively weak financial institutions. There is thus a case for direct support for the small scale sector to bring it nearer to its optimal size in the economy. Some of these measures are discussed in the next chapter. But it is equally clear from the discussion above that support policies would be self defeating if they merely aim at protecting the existence of small enterprises. All the objectives of policy require that the measures enacted to promote SSEs must aim at their development - which implies they must be encouraged to grow.
Given that the development of small – medium enterprises is desirable on both allocative efficiency and equity considerations, particularly in the new technological and market scenario, what are the major policy instruments available to governments to promote the small-medium sector? A conclusion was reached at the end of the last chapter that policy instruments need to be developed which do not just protect SSEs indiscriminately, but which help then develop in a dynamic and changing environment. This wold result in more efficient firms which are able to exploit the opportunities for growth Further, these instruments must ensure that firms with different efficiencies and potential for growth derive differential benefits from the assistance which is available. This implies that such instruments should have a general and pervasive in impact, rather than be specific to particular industries or groups within the SSI sector. The reservation of specified product line for the small scale sector has been central to Indian policies for development this sector. In India, policies based on reservation have persisted in the manufacturing sector over a long time, and India is almost unique in its dependence on and persistence with such policies. A large number of product groups – defined at a fairly detailed level using the National Industrial Classification Code – are reserved for the exclusive production by SSEs which are defined on the basis of value of fixed investment in plant and machinery. Once a product line is reserved, those firms with levels of investment exceeding the SE limit are restricted to the level of production equal to their installed capacity at the time of reservation. This method of fostering the growth of SSEs was first introduced in 1967 and the list of items has been progressively increased until today it comprises a total of around 830. The value of the limit in plant and machinery has been increased over time in nominal terms but the increase in value of this limit after allowing for inflation has been small. This line of approach had its value in the initial stages of encouraging the SSI sector. Large numbers of new SSI units were encouraged to establish themselves and protected from competition from the large-scale sector. But the problem with the continuation of such policies is that it is not sufficiently discriminatory in favour of small enterprises which show potential for growth. Industry based policies of reservation overlook the fact that small enterprises which show potential for growth Industry based policies of reservation overlook the fact that small enterprises is not confined to specific product lines, and that their importance in different product groups are constantly changing. In vie of this, there is a need to implement polices for the development of SSEs which are generally and have a pervasive effect in the sense that all small enterprises, no matter in what product groups, could potentially take advantage of the assistance measures available. Secondary, it is important that such policies do not discourage the growth of small into medium enterprises. 2.1 General and Pervasive Policies to Encourage SSEs
Protective macro-economic policies have particularly hurt SSEs in creating scarcity of good quality raw materials for these units. While LEs get access to raw materials at low regulated prices (in some cases on account of their export potential), SSEs have to scramble for materials in the open market. This is one, though not the only reason for SSEs producing at the lower end of the quality scale. In the Indian context, in spite of the concerns With SSE development in government policies there are many instances of both regulatory and macro polices being discriminatory to the small sector. The Committee on Simplification of Procedures for SSIs appointed by the Ministry of Industry (the Mhapatra Committee) pointed out that a small scale unit had to deal with about 20 Departments of government both Central and State – and that an entrepreneur had to interact with 50 inspectors. They ranged from Labour laws to Environmental, Excise and Developmental regulations some of them actually meant to provide subsidised services to SSEs. While large units can assign special staff for the purpose of filing returns to numerous bodies, the burden is quite disproportionate on small entrepreneurs. It has been mentioned above that a major item in the cost structure of SSEs is often the payments to a large body of inspectors who need to be induced to look the other way.
Industrial units are much more spatially dispersed in Taiwan. The important role played by SMEs in this economy needs to be studied more carefully. Like Hong Kong the adaptability of relatively small units seems to have been an important contributor to overall export success. The role of financial institutions in helping the SME sector in Taiwan is an important element of their success. Taiwan developed a widely distributed structure of manufacturing enterprises, many of which had low start-up capital like in Hong Kong. One study has stressed the importance of government supported financial institutions specialising in "Venture capital" lending in this process (Scitovsky 1985). The last point is of relevance to many countries of Asia which have had to cope with increasing job security of factory workers due to institutional and economic pressures. While subcontracting is obviously the most efficient way of increasing greater labour market flexibility, its successful development is critically dependent on large firms being able to transfer the know-how for quality production to the ancillary units, and to build up a relationship of healthy co-operation rather than dominance. The experience in several Asian countries has not been very satisfactory from this point of view. In countries and sectors like garments, in which some elements of production are "put out’ to small, often household enterprises, the labour market system is better described as "casualisation" to take advantage of depressed wages and working conditions. Skill formation is minimal among the subcontractors, who have little hope of branching out in other activities led by the parent company. One country which has successfully developed its sub-contracting in recent years is Korea. "In 1990 probably half of the output of small establishment was subcontracted. The radical change in industrial size structure wrought between 1975 and the early 1990s was partly a result of the changing composition of industrial output by sector but was also directly sought by policy, with a view to spreading the fruits of industrial growth more widely" (Berry 1996, basing himself on Baek 1992 and Cho 1995). The process was helped by the post-1987 changes in labour behaviour with rising worker militancy and labour costs, even as Korean industry faced increasing competition v. An important point to mention in the context of subcontracting is that the nature of indirect taxation might have an important effect on the growth of the subcontracting system. If the revenue system depends on excise taxes based on the gross value or quantity of the final product, firms will be discouraged from subcontracting out part of their operations. A system of MODVAT / VAT taxation (taxing value added at each stage of production) would remove the disincentive to subcontracting. While subcontracting involves vertical inter-firm co-operation, much interest has been expressed recently on the development of horizontal small-small co-operation. The idea that networks or "clusters" of mainly small firms, interacting themselves through specialisation and sharing of services, have been the key to the success of many industrial areas in developed countries, dominates the discussion of clusters. In a well-known work Piore and Sabel (1984) urgued that the vitality of small firms in the "Third Italy" lay in the co-operative competition among communities of enterprises, and on the broad skill of the labouring communities. In the Asian context favourable note has been taken of Trippur, a district in Southern India which became a major centre of cotton knitwear for both the export and home market in the decade after 1975 (Cawthorne 1995). In spite of considerable competitive rivalry among the large number of small-medium firms there was dense inter-firm linkages in production, sings of collective activity involving sharing of information about markets and design capability, and external economies reaped from the growing market for outputs and inputs, including labour. Cawthorne, however, makes the pertinent point that Tiruppur had been an industrial cluster for a long time before it embarked on its recent dynamic phase. This dynamism "is to a large extent a function of its having successfully entered export markets for high volume / low-to-medium quality knitwear goods…This suggests perhaps a more general point, that it is not clustering per se which makes for industrial success, but clustering in a propitious macroeconomic context" (Cawthorne p.54). One might add that plocy Help on the demand side of the market is probably more fundamental. Governments may provide some assistance in providing services which help the economics of clusters, but the major effort has to come from the entrepreneurs’ own initiatives, in Asia as in Italy. The role of the government would be to make provisions for assistance – financial, technical and marketing – which will be available to all members of the "cluster". Furthermore central provision for labour training, control of pollution and other control facilities carries important external economies, and hence can be provided more economically in "clusters"
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